Abstract-This paper presents a computationally efficient beamforming approach to combat wiretapping in a relay-based multiple-input multiple output (MIMO) communication system which is part of a cognitive radio (CR) network. The system operates in two stages, that is, multiple-access (MA) followed by broadcasting (BC) using physical layer network coding (PNC). The beamforming design is based on minimizing the mean square error (MSE) at the receiving node(s) while enforcing signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraints at the eavesdroppers. The constraints take into account uncertainty bounds on eavesdropper channel estimation errors. In each stage of communication, an optimization problem is devised and solved using an iterative procedure, considering two different types of eavesdropper functionality, i.e., selection combining and "blind" beamforming. Numerical results show the convergence of the MSE at the nodes and the SINR distributions at the eavesdroppers for both cases. Comparisons to previously suggested solutions for blind beamforming are also included showing improvements in MSE values in the MA stage and computational efficiency in both stages.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the number of data applications for mobile users continues to expand, cognitive radio (CR) keeps gaining interest for upcoming generations of cellular networks. CR technology can improve the utility of the licensed spectrum by allowing secondary users to access spectrum holes that are unoccupied by primary users. In effect, a CR device can sense, enter, and leave radio spectrum without causing harmful interference to primary users [1] , [2] .
Meanwhile, relay-based communication can be beneficial in extending coverage areas and reducing transmit power consumption. Cooperative relays in CR networks offer significant advantages, as they can forward data from a source node to a destination node by exploiting spectrum holes that they have sensed [3] . However, transmission scheduling schemes are needed to avoid interference of signals sent from different nodes to the relay. Physical layer network coding (PNC), proposed in [4] , makes use of the additive nature of concurrent incoming waves for identical coding operation. PNC-based two-way relaying can achieve 100% improvement in physical layer throughput over the traditional multi-hop transmission scheduling scheme and 50% over the straightforward network coding scheme as outlined in [5] .
Broadcasting signals makes them unprotected from illegitimate receivers that attempt to decode the data. The security aspects of CR systems [6] , [7] have attracted increasing attention from the research community since legitimate CR devices can become exposed to eavesdroppers which can intercept confidential information. While key-based enciphering has been the conventional data transmission security scheme, physical layer security (PLS) has gained considerable interest recently. PLS avails the noise and channel randomness to prevent eavesdroppers from decoding information at the bit level with welldesigned coding and transmit precoding schemes. In this way, PLS complements already existing security procedures applied in higher layers of the communication protocol stack [8] .
In the literature, secrecy for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems was studied using different schemes and considering different channel state information (CSI) availability cases. Security for MIMO amplify-and-forward relaying was investigated recently in [9] , [10] . Beamforming methods using enough power to ensure a certain signal-to-noise-plus interference ratio (SINR) at the authorized receivers were studied in [11] - [17] , with the remaining available power used to broadcast artificial noise (AN) orthogonal to the authorized receivers thereby degrading the quality of the eavesdropper's signal. Beamformer optimization based on the secrecy rate was studied in [18] - [20] , while the design for quality of service discrimination in two-way relay networks was investigated in [21] . The authors in [22] present the design of transmit and receive beamformers that minimize the mean-square-error (MSE) between authorized parties subject to the constraint that the MSE at the eavesdropper is above a threshold. Additionally, an overview of the physical-layer security aspects of CR networks was provided in [23] , where several security attacks as well as the related countermeasures are discussed.
In [24] , a secure beamforming design scheme was proposed for a relay-based MIMO communication system with blind eavesdroppers, where the system operates in two stages: multiple-access (MA) and broadcast (BC) using PNC. The design scheme finds transmit and receive beamforming vectors that minimize the MSE at the relay and the devices while keeping the eavesdropper SINR below a threshold. Imperfect eavesdropper CSI is considered where the post-processed channel estimation error is assumed to lie within a pre-defined uncertainty set characterized by a spherical bound. A semi-definite programming (SDP) approach is presented to solve this optimization problem.
In this paper, we first propose a beamforming design scheme for a similar system model, this time having smart eavesdroppers that can process their received signal better by exploiting diversity. In particular, the eavesdroppers are assumed to apply selection combining (SC) to their individual antenna signals. A solution to the corresponding robust design problem is presented via an SDP approach. Simulation results are provided for convergence of the MSE at the destination(s) and the SINR at the eavesdroppers for both the MA and BC stages. Secondly, we revisit the design problem studied by [24] with blind eavesdroppers and propose a more time-efficient secondorder cone (SOC) approach to this problem that can also satisfy its constraints and give optimal MSE values. Under given SINR constraints at the eavesdroppers, the SOC program finds beamforming vectors that output smaller MSE values at the destination than the approach in [24] . Additional results for the BC stage are also shown and discussed. A major advantage of our iterative approach is the time efficiency as it needs significantly shorter time to converge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the system model is presented. Section III deals with the beamforming design scheme for the case of eavesdroppers applying SC. Section IV presents the efficient beamforming design for the case of blind eavesdroppers. Section V provides numerical results from simulations showing the effectiveness of the proposed solutions for both eavesdropper models. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section VI.
As for notation, C m×n denotes the set of m×n matrices with elements in the complex field. 1 is a vector of ones. . denotes the Euclidean norm for finite dimensional vector spaces. E{.} and R{.} denote the expectation and real part respectively. (.)
T , (.) * , (.) H and Tr(.) denote the transpose, complex conjugate, Hermitian and trace of a matrix, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a CR sub-network comprising two devices (primary users) D 1 and D 2 , a relay R and K eavesdroppers E 1 , . . . , E K which try to decode the relayed data between D 1 and D 2 , as shown in Fig. 1 for K = 2. MIMO communication is considered with N di , N r and N e k denoting the number of antennas at D i , R and E k , respectively. All channels are assumed to be frequency-flat. The D i -to-R channels, denoted as H ir ∈ C Nr×N d i for i ∈ {1, 2}, are assumed reciprocal and perfectly known at the devices. The D i -to-E k channels,
. . , K}, are imperfectly known at the devices. Similarly, G rk ∈ C Ne k ×Nr is the R-to-E k channel assumed to be imperfectly known at R. R carries out PNC and provides bi-directional communication via time division duplexing in two stages as described next.
A. Multiple Access (MA) Stage
In this stage, devices D 1 and D 2 simultaneously transmit zero-mean unit-variance uncorrelated complex random symbols s d1 and s d2 , respectively, where it is assumed that E{s di s * di } = 
and E{s
At R, the superimposed signals are received and processed by a beamformer w r ∈ C Nr resulting in
where n r is the zero-mean additive Gaussian noise vector at R with covariance E{n r n H r } = σ 2 r I Nr and E{s di n H r } = 0. The superimposed signals from D 1 and D 2 are also received at the K eavesdroppers. At E k , they are beamformed by a vector w e k ∈ C Ne k resulting in
where n e k is the zero-mean additive Gaussian noise vector at
B. Broadcasting (BC) Stage
The received beamformed signal y r at R is utilized to find an estimate s r ∈ C of s d1 + s d2 with the aid of PNC mapping [4] . The estimate s r is then broadcast in the next time slot after being beamformed by v r ∈ C Nr . To detect the desired symbol, each device D i estimates s r using a beamforming vector v di ∈ C N d i , thus obtaining
where n di is the additive Gaussian noise vector at D i with zero mean and covariance matrix E{n di n
C. Channel Model and Error Bound
The following imperfect model for the D i -to-E k channel is assumed at D i :
whereĤ ik and E ik are the estimated and error components of the channel respectively. The post-processed model of the channel is represented by
whereĥ ik and e ik are the estimated and error components of the channel after beamforming by w e k . A spherical bound on the error component e ik is given as
for a known i > 0. The same model for the R-to-E k channel is assumed at R:
whereĜ rk and F rk are the estimated and error components of the channel. The post-processed model of the channel is
A spherical bound on the error component f rk is also assumed,
for a known δ r > 0.
III. SECRECY WITH EAVESDROPPERS APPLYING SELECTION COMBINING
The objective is to find transmit and receive beamforming vectors at R, D 1 and D 2 , while maintaining weak signal reception at the eavesdroppers. Special attention will be given to the MA stage since a single message (s d1 or s d2 ) may be sufficient to decode s r [4] . Afterwards, we will consider the BC stage, as the secrecy in the system can be further enhanced by appropriately designing the BC transmit and receive beamforming vectors at R and D i , respectively.
In practice, the eavesdroppers may not be naive and may apply smart processing to enhance its ability to decode the transmitted symbols. Exploiting diversity is one way the eavesdroppers may use to improve the quality of the decoded signals. In this paper, we focus on SC where each E k selects the strongest signal among the ones received at each one of its N e k antennas.
A. MA stage
We find the beamforming vectors w r , w d1 and w d2 that minimize the MSE at R, denoted MSE r , given by
subject to SINR constraints at each E k and power constraints at the devices.
Each eavesdropper E k is assumed to apply SC and select the strongest signal among the N e k received signals by the N e k antennas. Let Q = {q 1 , . . . , q Ne k } denote the set of standard basis vectors of R Ne k . Selection of the n th antenna at E k , n ∈ {1, . . . , N e k }, is equivalent to using q n as the receive beamforming vector. E k may choose w e k as follows
where SINR
is the SINR of the signal from D i received at the n th antenna of E k given by
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, and h
ik is assumed as explained in the previous section.
The beamforming design procedure can now be formulated as the following constrained optimization problem
A practical solution to this non-convex problem can be obtained using an iterative procedure after dividing it into three subproblems, as described next.
Sub-Problem 1: w d1 and w d2 are fixed to the values found in the previous iteration so that w r is the only variable to solve for in (14) . Since w r only appears in the objective function MSE r , to find its optimal value we compute the partial derivative of MSE r with respect to w r and equate it to zero. This way we obtain
Sub-Problem 2: To solve for w d1 , we fix w d2 to the same value used in sub-problem 1 and w r to its value computed in subproblem 1. Using (6), SINR
can be expanded so that (14) becomes min
The SINR and error component constraints in (16) can be rewritten as
where
and is chosen such that
Using the S-Procedure from [25] , (17) can be reformulated into a matrix inequality
with θ
Defining A i and b i as follows
we obtain the SDP relaxation of (16) with the modified constraints in (19) after replacing w d1 w H d1 with the matrix variable (21) on the next page. The problem in (21) is convex and can be solved using an SDP solver.
Sub-Problem 3:
To solve for w d2 , we fix w r and w d1 to their values found in sub-problems 1 and 2 respectively. The same approach is used here as in sub-problem 2 by applying the SDP relaxation of (16) with the modified constraints in (19) and replacing w d2 w
After initializing w di = P max /N di 1, all three subproblems are solved iteratively until MSE r converges. This procedure can be performed at D 1 and D 2 . After finding w r , the devices send it to R before data transmission.
B. BC Stage
As in the MA stage approach, the beamforming vector v e k ∈ Q at the n th antenna of E k is chosen such that, e.g., it produces the highest possible symbol-to-noise ratio of s r at E k , SNR k . The aim is to minimize the weighted sum of the MSEs of the received signals at D 1 and D 2 by choosing the appropriate vectors v r , v d1 and v d2 while also satisfying power and secrecy constraints. The MSE of the received signal s r at D i is denoted by MSE di , i = 1, 2, and it is computed as follows
where E{s r s * r } = ρ, with ρ representing the average normalized power of symbol s r realtive to s di . Both MSE d1 and MSE d2 are considered together by taking
where g
To hinder decoding of s r at any of the eavesdroppers, an upper bound λ k should be enforced on SNR
k . After including in the set of constraints the spherical bound on the channel error components, written in (10), the following optimization problem is to be solved
A practical solution to this non-convex problem can be obtained using an iterative procedure after dividing it into the following two sub-problems:
Sub-Problem 1: Here, the transmit beamforming vector v r is fixed, leaving v d1 and v d2 as the optimization variables appearing only in the objective function. Therefore, the value of v di is obtained by computing the partial derivative of MSE di with respect to v di and equating it to zero. We thus obtain
Sub-Problem 2: The receive beamforming vectors, v di are now fixed to the values obtained in the previous iteration, so the only variable remaining would be v r . Similar to the MA stage, the SNR and error constraints are modified and the problem (25) is reformulated using the S-procedure and by replacing v r v H r with V r to obtain the following convex problem, which
is solved using an SDP solver:
P max /ρN di 1, the two subproblems are solved iteratively until MSE d converges. This procedure can be performed at R, with the v di obtained sent to D i before data transmission.
IV. SECRECY WITH BLIND EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, we develop and solve the optimum beamformer design problem for the MA and BC stages, when the eavesdroppers do not know any of the channels nor the beamformers used at D i and R. In this case, it is assumed that thus they combine blindly the received signals to decode each symbol separately. That is, they use [24] 
A. MA Stage Here using an SOC-based approach, we find beamforming vectors w r , w d1 and w d2 that minimize MSE r subject to power constraints at the devices and SINR constraints at each E k . With no changes in the assumptions on D 1 , D 2 and R, the expression of MSE r in (11) and the power constraint on w di remain the same.
Given w e k in (28), the received SINR of s di at E k is given by
The SINR values at each E k are constrained to be less than a threshold γ k to hinder eavesdropping. By including in the set of constraints the spherical bound on the channel error components, written in (7), the following optimization problem is obtained:
This is a non-convex optimization problem. A solution can be obtained using an iterative procedure whose p th iteration consists of the following two major steps: Sub-Problem 1: To solve for w r , we use the same optimal solution as in [24] by fixing w d1 and w d2 to their values, w , from the previous iteration. Letting x
, taking the derivative of the objective function with respect to w r and setting it to zero yields
Sub-Problem 2: To solve for w d1 and w d2 , we fix w r to w (p)
r . The SINR constraint and channel estimation error bound can be transformed into a single constraint by considering the following approach. The denominator of equation (29) is made constant by fixing w d1 and w d2 to the values w that were utilized to calculate w r in sub-problem 1. In other words, to solve for the devices' beamforming vectors at the current p th iteration, w
According to [25] , after taking the square-root the inequality in (32) becomes a SOC constraint with w (p)
di the variable to solve for. The motivation behind fixing w dj to w (p−1) dj is based on the idea that after each iteration w (p−1) dj approaches a constant: its value that minimizes MSE r . To incorporate the channel error bound (7), observe that from (6) we can use the triangle inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to reach the made in the derivation of the method. This empirical adjustment ensures that the SINR guarantees for all methods are the same. That is, with the adjusted γ k , the eavesdropper SINR remains lower than the required level γ with near 100% probability. The results shown are averaged over many realizations of the channel matrices, the elements of which are i.i.d., drawn from standard complex Gaussian distribution. To demonstrate the computational efficiency of our approach in Section IV, we show in Table I a comparison of the time needed for each algorithm to converge during the MA stage: the SC method in Section III, the SOC method in Section IV and the method in [24] . The comparison is done for different numbers of eavesdroppers K. The SOC method is apparently more efficient, especially as K increases. Table II shows a comparison of the time needed for the MSE to converge for each of the corresponding algorithms during the BC stage. Again, the method presented in Sec. IV is more efficient Looking at the SC case separately, the additional number of SINR constraints in (21) and (27) increase the time needed for the solver to find solutions.
In Fig. 2 , we show the convergence of the MSE r averaged over many runs in the MA stage for γ = 0.7 and γ = 0.35. Thus γ s = 0.9γ = 0.63 and 0.315, respectively. In all cases, convergence is reached within a few iterations. The proposed SOC method produces a lower MSE than the SDP method in [24] and we can notice the average MSE increasing when γ decreases. The reason for obtaining higher MSE results for the SC case is that we imposed stricter constraints on the SINR at the eavesdroppers. Although not shown here, it is logical that the MSE increases with i since the users' uncertainty about the eavesdropper channel increases. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the SINR at E 1 during the MA stage for the same values of γ. We show the CDF of max{SINR
1 } for the three methods. The SOC method produces a higher SINR due to a lower MSE, however, still satisfying the constraint. The SINR values are lower for the SC case due to the stricter constraints imposed, and they are always below γ.
Similarly, Fig. 4 shows the MSE convergence during the BC stage. Both methods, the one in Section IV and the one in [24] , yield identical results, so we only show only one curve for both. The main advantage of using the method in Section IV is the time efficiency. Meanwhile, the higher MSE results for the SC case are due to the stricter SNR constraints imposed. However, this produced lower SNR values (less than λ) for the SC case as seen in Fig. 5 . The SNR CDFs for both methods in Section IV and [24] are identical and the SNRs are below the threshold λ with probability 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a robust SDP-based secure beamforming scheme for a MIMO relaying CR network with eavesdroppers applying SC to their signals. The scheme is based on minimizing the MSE at the legitimate receivers during two transmission time slots with imperfect eavesdropper CSI. The channel estimation error was assumed to be spherically bounded. The results proved the scheme to be reliable for secrecy. Moreover, we presented an SOC-based secure beamforming scheme for the same network however with blind eavesdroppers. Numerical examples showed that the SOC method is reliable, producing better MSE results, and more computationally efficient than the SDP method in [24] .
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